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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3713 
_____________ 
 
OVERLAND LEASING GROUP, LLC, 
 
                                                 Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
FIRST FINANCIAL CORPORATE SERVICES INC.;  
FORTRAN GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC.;  
F.F.C. SERVICES, INC.;  
GEORGE R. FUNARO & CO., P.C.;  
KMA ASSOCIATES;  
DINESH DALMIA; RADHA DALMIA;  
IGTL SOLUTIONS (USA), INC.;  
VANGUARD INFO-SOLUTIONS CORPORATION;  
GREG L. RHODES; THOMAS TURRIN & CO, CPA, P.C.; 
AND JOHN DOES I THROUGH IX 
 
GEORGE R. FUNARO & CO., P.C., 
                                                            Third Party Plaintiff, 
      
v. 
 
SANJEET ANAND and JOHN DOES I through X, 
                                                                Third Party Defendants, 
 
THOMAS TURRIN & CO., CPA, P.C., 
                                                          Third Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
R. VIJAYKUMAR; SANJEET ANAND; JOHN DOES, I through X, 
                                                              Third Party Defendants, 
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_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 06-cv-5850) 
District Judge:  Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 7, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Overland Leasing Group, LLC, (“Overland”), appeals the decision of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment in favor 
of George R. Funaro & Co., P.C., (“Funaro”), and Thomas Turrin & Co., CPA, P.C. 
(“Turrin”).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.   Background 
In 2004, Allserve Systems Corp., (“Allserve”) leased computer equipment from 
Fortran Group International, Inc. (“Fortran”) and First Financial Corporate Services, Inc., 
(“First Financial”), pursuant to a master lease agreement.  Overland acquired Fortran’s 
and First Financial’s interests in that leased equipment in March 2005.  Prior to that, 
Funaro, which is an accounting firm, issued an Independent Auditor’s Report (“Funaro 
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Report”) of Allserve’s financial statements in June 20041 and a report compiling 
Allserve’s financial statements in January 2005 (the “Compilation”).  Near the end of 
July 2005, Turrin, another accounting firm, prepared an audit report (“Turrin Report”) of 
Allserve’s finances for the year ending March 31, 2005.  In August 2005, Allserve ceased 
making payments on the equipment and subsequently declared bankruptcy.   
In December 2006, Overland filed suit against numerous parties, including Funaro 
and Turrin (together, “Appellees”).  Overland alleged that it was defrauded during the 
purchase of the equipment leased to Allserve and that Appellees furthered that fraud by 
preparing financial statements and audits that did not accurately reflect the financial 
condition of Allserve.  Specifically, Overland alleged both that Appellees committed 
accountants’ malpractice and negligent misrepresentation of financial information and 
that Appellees intentionally and recklessly misrepresented Allserve’s financial condition.   
The District Court granted Appellees’ motions for summary judgment on those 
claims.  Applying New Jersey law pursuant to its previous conflict of laws analysis, the 
District Court held that a non-client, such as Overland, cannot recover from accountants, 
such as Appellees, for malpractice and negligent representation unless it can establish the 
three elements set forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-25(b)(2) (the “New Jersey Statute”),  
namely that the accountants agreed that their services would be made available to the 
                                              
1
 In September 2004, Funaro learned of discrepancies in Allserve’s audited 
financial statements and demanded return of all the copies of the Funaro Report.  
Ultimately, through the efforts of its staff and outside counsel, Funaro located 38 of the 
original 40 copies of the Funaro Report issued to Allserve.   
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third party who was specifically identified to them, that the accountants knew the third 
party would rely on the professional accounting service in connection with a specific 
transaction, and that the accountants directly expressed their understanding of the third 
party’s intended reliance.   
Viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Overland, the 
District Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Overland had 
failed to adduce evidence establishing any of the elements of the New Jersey Statute with 
respect to either of the Appellees.  The District Court also found in favor of Appellees on 
Overland’s intentional tort claim.  In its timely appeal, Overland has limited its 
arguments to the District Court’s decision on the malpractice and negligent 
misrepresentation claims.   
II.   Discussion
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Overland argues that the District Court erred in deciding that the New Jersey 
Statute applies to the Appellees.  It says that the New Jersey Statute applies only to 
accountants licensed in New Jersey, not to accountants licensed in other states, as 
Appellees are.  We need not address the merits of that argument here,
 
however, for even 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of an 
order granting summary judgment, “may affirm the order when the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party,” and “may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported 
by the record.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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if the New Jersey Statute does not apply to Appellees, New York law would and 
Appellees would still prevail.
3
  
Without the New Jersey Statute, New Jersey law demands application of the broad 
common-law foreseeability rule.  Cf. E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 
846 A.2d 1237, 1240 (N.J. 2004) (holding that “the manifest legislative intent in adopting 
[the Statute] was to … restore the concept of privity to accountants’ liability towards 
third parties”).  New York’s law, however, requires a relationship between accountants 
and third parties “approach[ing] that of privity” before liability attaches to an 
accountant’s acts of negligence – a standard very similar to that imposed under the New 
Jersey Statute.  Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 119 
(N.Y. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, since the outcome of the 
negligence claim might differ under New Jersey law (sans Statute) and New York law, 
we must conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis under the law of the forum state, New Jersey.  
See Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that, in 
a diversity case, the conflict-of-laws rules of the forum state apply). 
 New Jersey law directs us to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) 
(the “Restatement”), to determine which state’s law to apply.  See P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. 
                                              
3
 The District Court chose to apply New Jersey law after finding that New York 
law and New Jersey law – inclusive of the New Jersey Statute – were substantively the 
same.  If the New Jersey Statute applies to Appellees, we agree with that analysis and the 
District Court’s disposition of the case.  Since we choose to avoid the state law issue 
concerning the applicability of the Statute, our analysis proceeds on a different track. 
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Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 455 (N.J. 2008) (applying the Restatement in a conflict-of-
laws analysis in a tort action); Debra F. Fink, D.M.D., MS, PC v. Ricoh Corp., 839 A.2d 
942, 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) (applying § 148 of the Restatement in a conflict-of-laws 
analysis in an action for misrepresentation); Vail v. Pan Am Corp., 616 A.2d 523, 527 n.3 
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) (citing to § 148 of the Restatement for conflict-of-laws 
rules regarding misrepresentation).  Three sections of the Restatement are relevant to a 
conflict-of-laws analysis in this case.  First, § 6 of the Restatement prescribes several 
“cornerstone” factors relevant to choosing the appropriate rule of law, see Camp Jaycee, 
962 A.2d at 458 (acknowledging § 6 of the Restatement as the “cornerstone of the entire 
Restatement”), including “the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,” “the protection of 
justified expectations,” “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,” and “ease in 
the determination and application of the law to be applied[,]”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).  
Second, § 145 of the Restatement provides specific guidance for choosing which 
rule of law is appropriate to apply in tort actions:  “The rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with 
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties under the principles stated in § 6.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 145(1) (1971).  Section 145 also includes four specific factors to be weighed 
when determining which state has the most significant relationship:  “(a) the place where 
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the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the 
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, 
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).   
Third, § 148 of the Restatement highlights additional relevant factors to be 
considered in a conflict-of-laws analysis for actions concerning misrepresentation, 
including negligent misrepresentation, when a plaintiff’s reliance took place at least in 
part in a state other than where the false representations were made.
4
  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(2) (1971).  Those additional factors include:  
 (a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the 
defendant’s representations, (b) the place where the plaintiff received the 
representations, (c) the place where the defendant made the representations, 
… (e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the 
transaction between the parties was situated at the time, and (f) the place 
where the plaintiff is to render performance under a contract which he has 
been induced to enter by the false representations of the defendant.   
 
Id. 
Many of those factors referenced in the Restatement are relevant and readily 
apparent from the record.  Overland is a Delaware company with headquarters in 
Massachusetts and an office in New York; Appellees are accountants licensed in New 
                                              
4
 We assume, for the sake of completeness, that some of Overland’s reliance took 
place in New Jersey, even though the record appears to indicate that Overland’s reliance 
took place wholly in New York.  Otherwise, if Overland’s reliance occurred wholly in 
New York, § 148 of the Restatement would expressly direct application of New York law 
since the reliance and representations occurred in the same state.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §  148(1) (1971).  
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York; and Allserve is a Texas company with a principal place of business in New Jersey.  
The alleged negligent misrepresentations of the Appellees are within the reports finalized 
at and disseminated from Appellees’ offices in New York.5  The agreements by which 
Overland acquired its interest in the leased equipment were executed by a representative 
of Overland’s New York office, listed Overland’s contact address in New York, and 
designated New York law as controlling.  It also appears that some, if not all, of 
Overland’s activity involving review of the reports produced by Appellees and the 
reliance by Overland on those reports occurred in New York.
6
  Furthermore, while New 
Jersey has an interest in ensuring that companies that operate within its borders do not 
employ negligent accountants to audit their books, New York has a compelling interest in 
applying its law in a predictable, uniform manner to activities by New York licensed 
accountants that occurred in New York and that allegedly induced a company’s New 
York employees to enter into a contract on behalf of their employer in which New York 
law was chosen as controlling.  In light of these considerations, New York law is 
                                              
5
 Whatever work Appellees may have done in New Jersey, if any, to prepare their 
reports, the alleged misrepresentations that form the basis of Overland’s cause of action 
occurred in New York. 
6
 Overland asserts that “decisions are made” at its principal place of business in 
Boston, Massachusetts.  (Reply Brief at 15, 17.)  However, Stephan Parisi, the primary 
credit analyst for Overland at the time of the transaction at issue here, stated during his 
deposition that he, his boss, and his boss’s supervisor were responsible for “perform[ing] 
the credit analysis for th[e] transaction” and were located in Overland’s New York office.  
(App. at 545-47, 551.)  
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properly applied to Overland’s accountants’ malpractice and negligent misrepresentation 
claims. 
Under New York law, Appellees cannot be liable to Overland “for the negligent 
preparation of financial reports” unless a relationship “approach[ing] that of privity” 
existed between them; i.e., “(1) [the Appellees] must have been aware that the financial 
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of 
which [Overland] was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been some conduct on 
the part of [Appellees] linking them to [Overland], which evinces [Appellees’] 
understanding of [Overland’s] reliance.”  Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 115, 118.  
Overland has presented no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely to 
find that such a relationship existed between it and either Appellee.  There is no evidence 
in the record that either Appellee communicated with Overland with respect to the 
purchase of the leased equipment at issue or that either Appellee exhibited any conduct 
that would show that they knew or understood that Overland was relying on the 
representations Appellees made in the reports at issue.
7
  Therefore, Overland’s claims 
                                              
7
 Nor is there any evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely to find that 
Overland actually relied on any representation made by either Appellee when deciding 
whether or not to purchase the leased equipment.  Overland’s primary credit analyst 
stated that his report to Overland’s Investment Committee regarding the underwriting and 
recommendation for purchasing the leased equipment from Fortran did not rely on the 
Funaro Report and that he did not receive the Compilation until after issuing a 
commitment letter to one defendant involved in the purchase and on the same day as 
issuing its commitment letter to Fortran.  Likewise, the Turrin Report did not even exist 
at the time that Overland decided to purchase the leased equipment.   
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against the Appellees must fail, and summary judgment in favor of Appellees was 
proper.
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III.   Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
8
 Overland also asserts that even if Funaro is “insulated by the [New Jersey 
Statute]” for the opinions in the Funaro Report, Funaro is still liable under the “standards 
of ordinary negligence” for its failed attempt to retrieve every copy of the Funaro Report 
after learning of the document’s potential inaccuracies.  (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 
30.)  That argument is unpersuasive.  The harm Overland claims that it suffered from 
Funaro’s alleged common law breach of a duty to diligently track down every copy of the 
Funaro Report is that it relied on the misrepresentations in a copy of that Report that 
Funaro failed to locate.  That line of reasoning, of course, is inconsistent with our 
conclusion that, under New York law, the benefit of liability extends only to those in a 
relationship “approaching privity” with the accountant.  Credit Alliance, 483 A.2d at 115.  
The liability theory Overland presses is even further removed from the idea of privity, 
and we do not think New York would extend the benefit of accountant liabilty to 
someone who happens on a stray report. 
